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A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY?
Susan Rose-Ac kerman *
THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL
CONSTITUTION. By Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan. New
York: Cambridge University Press. 1980. Pp. xiv, 231. $22.50.
The Power to Tax seeks to replace one economic orthodoxy with
another. Despite their iconoclasm, Geoffrey Brennan and James
Buchanan are closer to mainline public finance economists than they
would like to admit. Both the dominant orthodoxy and The Power to
Tax fail to transcend the limits of neoclassical economics as a formal
theory of political economy. While their methods of evasion are dif-
ferent, both iconoclasts and mainliners fail to take seriously the dis-
tinctive features of modem democratic policies - elections,
bureaucracy, and an ongoing effort at complex normative
evaluation.
I. TAX POLICY IN A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY
Before exploring these common limitations, however, it is impor-
tant to sketch the outlines of the controversy as the protagonists
themselves understand it. The two schools of thought differ, above
all, in defining the primary audience for their work. Mainline econ-
omists imagine themselves proffering advice to a benevolent ruler
interested in economic efficiency and social justice. In contrast,
Brennan and Buchanan see themselves as critical observers of a gov-
ernment run by selfish men and women. They wish to write a fiscal
constitution that effectively constrains the self-seeking behavior of
politicians and bureaucrats.
Consequently, Brennan and Buchanan's formal modeling of gov-
ernment begins from a radically different starting point than the
more familiar orthodoxy. They assume a single monopolistic ruler
("Leviathan") who tries to maximize the difference between revenue
collected and money spent on public services (or in a slightly more
sophisticated version, who maximizes a utility function defined over
public services and surplus revenue). The ruler is a "king"
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threatened with neither revolution nor electoral defeat and con-
strained only by a set of binding constitutional rules. The authors
are rather diffident about this particular formulation, and take care
to point out that their fundamental commitment is not to the details
of their model, but to a view of politicians as essentially selfish.
This basic point of view is a useful and much needed antidote to
the standard perspective. Even the most sophisticated prescriptions
of economic policy-makers may fail, not because they are wrong, but
because they are distorted by the self-interest of politicians and bu-
reaucrats. The central theoretical question then becomes how this
selfishness ought to enter the formal analysis.' It is here that Bren-
nan and Buchanan make a critical move. Because their government
is a monopolistic Leviathan, they can draw heavily on an economic
theory of monopoly that was never designed to confront the distinc-
tive characteristics of democratic politics. While the model is merely
a working hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan do use it to generate
some very specific conclusions. Since Leviathan seeks to maximize
its net return, it wants to tax goods with inelastic supplies or de-
mands; it thinks that broad tax bases are better than narrow ones,
and it prefers taxes that can carefully discriminate between taxpayers
on the basis of willingness-to-pay. In short, Leviathan wants a basic
tax system that is close to the ideal advanced by the standard econo-
mist interested in minimizing the "excess burden" of taxation and in
tying taxes to the benefits of public services. 2 Both Leviathan and
1. For related critiques, see Musgrave, Leviathan Cometh - Or Does He?, in TAX AND
EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 77 (H. Ladd & T.N. Tideman eds.) (Urban Institute, COUPE
Papers on Public Economics, No. 5, 1981); Oates, Discussion ofMusgrave andBrennan, in id. at
139. These papers comment on Brennan, Tax Limits and the Logic of Constitutional Restric-
tions,in id. at 121.
2. One branch of the optimal taxation literature has been entirely unconcerned with the
benefits of public services. Instead, the task is to raise a fixed amount of revenue with the least
distortion to the economy, le., with the minimum of excess burden. With elastic supplies, no
income effects, and zero cross-elasticities of demand, tax rates should be set in inverse propor-
tion to the price elasticity of demand. In a general equilibrium framework, no such straight-
forward results are possible because the optimal rates also depend upon cross-elasticities and
income effects. However, in the special case where the utility function is directly additive, the
optimal tax rate is higher, the lower the income elasticity of demand (Le., necessities should be
taxed more heavily than luxuries). The relevant literature is summarized in A. ATKINSON & J
STIGLITZ, ESSAYS IN PUBLIC EcoNoMIcs 366-93 (1980).
When production exhibits nonconstant returns to scale so that inframarginal firms earn
profits, then the elasticity of supply is important. Ceterisparibus, the tax rate should be higher
on inelastically supplied goods. See id. at 464-68.
Another strand of public finance literature attempts to link taxes to individual benefits.
Thus, in a Lindahl tax system, tax "prices" are set separately for each individual so that every-
one demands the same level of services. There have also been a few attempts to characterize
the optimal level of public services when lump sum nondistortionary taxes are impossible. See
id. at 482-97, 505-12.
A final portion of the "optimal" taxation literature is concerned with the use of the tax and
subsidy system for redistributive purposes. These models generally postulate one or another
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the conventional economist seek tax bases that minimize citizens'
ability to shift away from the tax, and both want to tailor taxes to
individuals. Of course, their reasons for wanting such a system are
very different. The proponent of "optimal" taxation hopes to raise
revenue to minimize efficiency losses and to reflect differences in in-
dividual benefits from public goods. In contrast, Leviathan hopes to
maximize revenue collections, or, in a more complex version, to
maximize the difference between spending on public goods and
taxes. Since Leviathan's interests are directly opposed to the inter-
ests of the bulk of the population, people who accept this selfish-
despot model would seek to constrain Leviathan constitutionally.
They, like Brennan and Buchanan, would want to impose con-
straints that ensure an inefficient tax system to prevent an oppressive
exercise of monopoly power. This kind of fiscal constitution would
specify that taxes be levied on a narrowly defined base of elastically
demanded goods and that rates be uniform across goods and
people.3
This neat reversal of the standard results is clever and disturbing,
but it also shows that constitutional constraints of the kind proposed
can have serious consequences for economic efficiency if, perchance,
the ruler is not a greedy Leviathan. Indeed, one danger of the au-
thors' constitutional theory is that it will become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. A document written to give little leeway for public-
spirited behavior is likely to attract few "statesmen" into politics.
The only people attracted to careers as civil servants or elected repre-
sentatives would be narrow opportunists who (almost by definition)
would not find the constitutional constraints burdensome. Brennan
and Buchanan, however, probably do not view this as a disadvan-
tage of their constititutional approach. In fact, they worry that tax
limits do not go far enough to constrain decision-makers who care
about other things besides their own private creature comforts:
"constraints become much less effective, and may well be evaded, if
the motive force behind governmental action is 'do-goodism.' The
exogenously given social welfare function and design a tax system to fulfill this goal. I discuss
this branch of the literature when I deal with Brennan and Buchanan's treatment of distribu-
tive issues. See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
3. See chs. 3-5. As the authors point out, the analogy between a monopolist and a Levia-
than government is not exact because the government does use some proportion of its revenue
to produce public services. Pp. 74-75. It is possible, therefore, that taxpayers might prefer the
government to set different sales tax structures for different individuals rather than be required
to set a uniform proportional tax on some good. Pp. 69-76. However, the authors point out
that this case is likely to be of little practical importance since "the possibility of any enforce-
able and effective differentiation over quantities purchased would be limited to nonstorable
commodities." P. 76.
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licentious sinners we can control; the saintly ascetics may destroy us"
(p. 166).
II. A REDUCTIONIST THEORY
But have Brennan and Buchanan done more than parody the ad-
mitted inadequacies of the conventional economic wisdom - replac-
ing the benevolent despot with the selfish Leviathan? Even the nalve
observer of politics recognizes a richer reality. Rather than a mono-
lithic state, there is a multitude of political actors. Rather than pure
selfishness, at least some political actors try to take normative ques-
tions seriously. These complex concerns are transformed into con-
crete policies by the distinctive institutions of modern representative
democracy, where electoral politics coexist uneasily with bureau-
cratic implementation.
How have Brennan and Buchanan managed to cut through these
political realities to develop their drastically simplified model? It is
useful to see their construct as the product of three related reduction-
ist arguments that narrow the focus of their inquiry.
The first and most important reductionist argument is
Buchanan's effort to deny the propriety of ongoing normative evalu-
ation in political life. Indeed, in The Limits to Liberty, 4 he made
explicit his desire to avoid all talk of distributive justice. Instead,
property rights are to be grounded in each person's "threat advan-
tage" under anarchy. People differ in tastes and capacities, and their
threat advantages are determined by guessing what distribution
would arise from violence, stealth, and cajolery in the absence of a
government. For some unexplained reason, Buchanan calls this the
"natural" distribution and bases his social contract on this
foundation.5
Yet if property rights are appropriately based on private "threat
advantages," why should they not also be based on public threats,
the raw power of the government to do as it likes? Despite their
efforts to avoid normative arguments, Brennan and Buchanan
merely fail to justify their underlying normative premise. If they be-
lieve that private power is "good," or at least unchallengeable, they
need a normative theory explaining why the state ought not to decide
that some private threats are unjust. Their blindness is most evident
in their failure to treat seriously the impact of concentrated private
4. J. BUCHANAN, THE Limns TO LIBERTY (1975).
5. Id. at 49-50. If a person's threat advantage changes over time, then the social contract
should change to reflect this. Id. at 77.
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power on government. 6 In fact, all their modeling exercises implic-
itly assume perfectly competitive private markets, with no monopo-
listic concentration of wealth.
This perspective makes it easy for the authors to adopt a very
truncated view of day-to-day government. Despite their refusal to
justify normatively the "natural" distribution of property rights,
their constitutional theory nonetheless tries to ensure that this distri-
bution remains sacrosanct. Once the distribution of property has
been fixed by the constitution, the only legitimate function of gov-
ernment is the correction of externalities and the production of
goods that cannot be efficiently provided by private markets. The
practical difficulty here is to design a political system that keeps the
distributive issues involved in setting up property rights separate
from the system of taxing and spending. It seems extremely unlikely
that such a division can be maintained, especially where constitu-
tionally protected rights depend upon the relative advantages of var-
ious people under anarchy. A system based on threat advantage
seems inherently unstable. People would always be trying to im-
prove their status to give them a perceived advantage under anarchy.
If, however, one ignores the possibility of continuing governmen-
tal instability as threat advantages are redefined, the authors' narrow
view of the function of taxation permits them to make a second re-
ductionist move: electoral constraints have no particular legitimacy.
If redistribution were a legitimate tax objective, political power
could not be based only on the distribution of private property. In-
stead, it might seem sensible to use a relatively egalitarian voting
system to decide how inegalitarian the property system ought to be.
It would then be impossible to consider tax policy without taking
redistribution through democratic politics seriously. In contrast,
Brennan and Buchanan wish to protect the "natural" distribution of
property based on threat advantage by insisting that unanimity is the
ideal voting rule.7 This effectively limits the government to projects
that will make everyone better off - all taxes are "benefit taxes" tied
to each individual's gains from particular public policies. Since, as a
6. Cf. Rae, The Limits of ConsensualJDecision, 69 Am. POL. Scl. REV. 1270, 1292, 1293-94
(1975). Rae considers J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962),
along with other theories based on consent. "The doctrine [of consent] has grown subtler, but
retains the mark of its birth: a single-minded attention to public power and a corresponding
inattention to its alternatives." Rae, supra at 1293. See generally Goldberg, Institutional
Change and the Quasi-InvLsible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1974).
7. The belief that unanimity is the best voting system in an ideal world is also held by more
conventional public finance economists. Thus, Musgrave, supra note 1, at 112, in a critique of
Brennan and Buchanan's theory, writes that "budgeting by unanimous agreement would be
ideal if there were no difficulty in securing the revelation of preferences."
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practical matter, unanimity cannot be used for day-to-day political
choices, Brennan and Buchanan are willing to compromise their
ideal. Nevertheless, they wish to structure government to prevent
redistribution through democratic politics: "[['o the extent that the
constitution lays down private property rights and laws against inter-
ference with those rights, these laws must be interpreted and en-
forced essentially independently of in-period politics" (p. 18).
The third reduction follows naturally. Since majoritarian judg-
ments have no special legitimacy, it does not seem important to con-
sider carefully how they might constrain the behavior of elected
officials and bureaucrats. In fact, the authors go so far as to claim
that "majoritarian rule can best be modeled as if it embodies no ef-
fective constraint on the exercise of government powers at all" (p. 7).
Although Brennan and Buchanan do not like the possibility for re-
distribution inherent in majority rule, this does not mean that voting
processes impose no constraints. They simply impose constraints
which Brennan and Buchanan do not like.8 While Buchanan has
stressed the importance of institutional design in other writings,9 The
Power to Tax relegates such issues to the periphery.
After depriving politics of redistributional content, after denying
majoritarian voting any special legitimacy, after ignoring the power
of institutional constraints on politicians and bureaucrats, The Power
to Tax is left with a stark picture of Leviathan - intent only on
using taxation to rip off the citizenry. But this model can be no bet-
ter than the three reductionist premises on which it is based.
III. TOWARD A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
The inadequacies of The Power to Tax should not lead one to
dismiss its powerful critique of mainstream public finance. Indeed,
when compared with mainstream theorists, the authors are relatively
sophisticated about government. At least they self-consciously rec-
ognize that their Leviathan is an oversimplification of political real-
ity, and make some effort to justify their reductionist premises. In
contrast, conventional public finance has all too often embraced sim-
ilar assumptions without finding it necessary to justify them at all.
While the dominant tradition assumes a benevolent government, it is
8. Brennan and Buchanan, pp. 173-84, do discuss the advantages of a federal system with
competitive state and local government, but they fail to emphasize the costs of such competi-
tion when it results in beggar-thy-neighbor policies. For a critique of multiple models of gov-
ernment, see Rose-Ackerman, Beyond T7ebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local
Government in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES (P. Mieszkowski & G. Zodrow eds.
1982) (forthcoming).
9. See especially the second half of J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 6.
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no more interested in complex normative arguments than Brennan
and Buchanan. Instead, it attempts to assess the "optimality" of a
tax by postulating the existence of an exogenously fixed "social wel-
fare function."' 0 This technique makes it possible for mainstream
economists to function as skilled technicians, unconcerned with the
messy complexity of democratic politics. If they think about govern-
ment at all, they view political and bureaucratic practices as unfortu-
nate constraints upon a benevolent despot interested in overall
efficiency, full employment, and growth - interested, in short, in
listening to technically competent economic advice. I
But it is possible to do better than this. While there may have
been a time when philosophers themselves despaired of contributing
to political argument, 12 today's error may well be overconfidence.
John Rawls' work' 3 has had the most impact on normative economic
analysis, probably because economists can reduce it to the simple
10. This is done in spite of the fact that a pluralistic society is unlikely to be able to agree
on a social welfare function. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(1951). Such research postulates a social welfare function that might, for example, be "Rawl-
sian," utilitarian, or egalitarian, and then examines the tax implications of this choice. See A.
ATKINSON & J. STIGLnTZ, supra note 2, at 394-423; Cooter & Helpman, Optimal Taxationfor
Transfer Payments, 88 Q.J. ECON. 656 (1974). Cooter and Helpman write: "Optimal tax rates
for redistribution must be obtained through maximization of a social welfare function." Id. at
656. They then examine the implications for tax policy of seven alternative welfare goals.
Their "democratic" welfare function merely maximizes the utility of the class of median abil-
ity, id. at 658, and ignores all the difficulties of majoritarian political procedures.
11. Atkinson and Stiglitz in their graduate public economics text, A. ATKINSON & J. STIO-
LITZ, supra note 2, spend only one of their eighteen lectures on theories of the state. Id. at 294-
330. However, in their concluding lecture they do call for a return to "political economy." Id.
at 576.
Of course, Brennan and Buchanan are not the only economists to criticize research in
mainstream public finance. Early work by Downs, A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957), has been followed in recent years by a growth in the field of public
choice. For a review of the literature, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). It remains
true, however, that this work has had surprisingly little impact on work by public finance
economists. For one exception, see Aumann & Kurz, Power and Taxes, 45 ECONOMETRICA
1137 (1977).
In the study of public regulation and public policy, however, the political economic ap-
proach is of growing importance in developing positive theories of government behavior. See,
eg., Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory o/Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976);
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MOMT. Sci. 335 (1974); Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MOMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
12. This was apparently a widely held view in the fifties and sixties. See PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY (P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979). In the introduction, id. at 2, the
editors quote Isaiah Berlin:
"No commanding work of political theory has appeared in the 20th century." So said
Isaiah Berlin, writing in 1962 in the second volume of Philosophy, Politics and Society in
answer to the question Does Political Theory StillExist? He was taking up a point made
six years earlier in the introduction to the first volume. The outstanding difference now,
in 1978, is that Berlin's assertions no longer are true.
13. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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formula: "Maximize the position of the worst off class."'14 Books by
Robert Nozickl5 and Bruce Ackerman,16 as well as a flood of more
narrowly focused articles in journals like Ethics and Philosophy and
Public Affairs, indicate the continuing vitality of the field. More-
over, much of this work can be used to enrich research in theoretical
welfare economics and public choice. The task is to make use of
these normative arguments without reducing them to conventional
Bergsonian social welfare functions.
17
The existence of this continuing philosophical debate makes a
point that transcends the ideas of any particular political theorist.
Just as philosophers do not agree on the proper distribution of
wealth and power, neither will ordinary citizens. And if no status
quo or benchmark distribution is widely accepted, procedural fair-
ness becomes an important element of constitutional design. Even if
the constitution writers do not believe that they can legitimately im-
pose their own view of the best substantive distribution, the political
procedures that they establish will have implications for the future
development of property rights and the distribution of wealth.18
Our collective inability to agree on a fair distribution of property
rights may well provide the strongest argument for an egalitarian
distribution of voting power. By severing the distribution of votes
from the distribution of property, a democratic state can symbolize
the problematic character of any existing property distribution. The
one person-one vote principle, moreover, captures what appears to
be a widely held notion of fair process. Thus, one test of the legiti-
macy of an inegalitarian system of property rights may be its capac-
ity to gain the ongoing support of an egalitarian political system.
As long as there is private inequality, there will be a tension be-
tween the procedural equality of an idealized political system and
the substantive inequality of material resources. This makes the
study of political corruption, broadly conceived, a matter of central
importance: How insulated should the political system be from the
private property system? Rather than making some intuitive distinc-
14. Rawls himself would, however, be unlikely to accept such an oversimplified caricature
of his work.
15. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
16. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
17. See Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Wefare Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON.
314 (1938); Bergson, On the Concept of Social Welfare 68 Q.J. ECON. 233 (1954).
18. Interestingly, this basic point of view with its emphasis on procedure is close to
Buchanan's own position except that he takes no position in favor of equality. He writes, "The
'goodness' of an outcome is evaluated on procedural criteria applied to the means of its attain-
ment and not on substantive criteria intrinsic to such outcomes.' J. BUCHANAN, supra note 4,
at 164.
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tion between outright bribery and more indirect uses of wealth to
influence votes, the normative challenge is to define "corruption" by
explaining why the exercise of private power can be inconsistent
with fair democratic process. 19 Even if one can define "corrupt"
practices with the aid of such a theory, a second question remains for
empirical analysis. Given a normative theory that permits a rela-
tively small role for private wealth in politics, it is still possible that
the wealthy may gain influence over time - permitting them to
achieve a legislative redefinition of corruption that increasingly fa-
vors their interest. Systematic analysis of this possibility could pro-
vide a rigorous theoretical framework for the constitutional debate
surrounding Buckley v. Valeo20 and campaign finance reform.
But it is not enough to insulate political choice effectively from
the inegalitarian distribution of private wealth and power. It re-
mains to define the procedures through which the preferences of in-
dividual citizens are aggregated into political choice. Majority rule
has frequently been accepted, especially by constitutional lawyers, 21
as a self-evidently desirable, egalitarian procedure. A major contri-
bution of social choice theory, however, has been simultaneously to
illuminate and to undercut the foundations of this belief.
A landmark result in formal social choice theory gave majoritari-
anism conceptual support by transforming our vague normative in-
tuitions about majority rule into a precise formulation. In 1952,
K.O. May22 established a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for majority rule that have substantial normative force. May showed
that majority rule was the only rule that satisfies a set of four axioms.
The first two require that the voting procedure be neutral with re-
spect to options and anonymous with respect to voters. His neutral-
ity axiom requires that no option be favored (or disfavored) more
than any other. Thus, there can be no status quo or benchmark posi-
tion that plays a special role. Brennan and Buchanan's ideal proce-
dure, which requires unanimous consent before a change can be
made, obviously does not satisfy "neutrality." May's requirement of
anonymity, in turn, implies that no voter is more favored than any
other. One must be able to rename the voters with no change in the
outcome. In short, these two axioms require that both options and
individuals be treated symmetrically. If one believes that distribu-
19. See S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978).
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
21. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
22. May, A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufcient Conditionsfor Simple Majority De.
cision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952).
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tive issues are at the heart of politics, such an egalitarian bias seems,
at leastprimafacie, a fair starting point.
The two other axioms require the procedure to be "decisive" and
"positively responsive." A decisive procedure is simply one that can
rank any two alternatives no matter what the preferences of the vot-
ers happen to be. For two options, X and Y, it will tell us either that
X is socially preferred to Y, Y is preferred to X, or X and Y are
indifferent. Notice that neither a rule requiring less than majority
support nor a rule requiring more than majority support is decisive,
taken by itself. Thus a rule stating that one option is socially pre-
ferred to another if at least forty percent of the people prefer the first
to the second is not decisive if forty percent prefer X to Y while sixty
percent prefer Y to X. Alternatively, if sixty percent support is re-
quired for passage, the rule would be unable to decide between X
and Y if fifty-five percent preferred X and forty-five percent prefer-
red Y. The sixty percent rule could be made decisive by fixing one
option as a status quo that persists unless a new proposal obtains
over sixty percent of the votes, but this added condition would vio-
late neutrality.
"Positive responsiveness" is a strong condition, but it seems con-
sistent with liberal democratic principles. This axiom asserts that if
society is indifferent between two options, X and Y, and ifX goes up
in someone's preference relative to Y, and does not fall in anyone
else's, then X must be socially preferred to Y. Basically, this condi-
tion means that the decision rule cannot have large ranges of social
indifference unless most individuals are actually indifferent between
many options. For example, it rules out a social choice procedure in
which society declares itself to be indifferent between all efficient
points.2 3
May's achievement was to show that these axioms are necessary
and sufficient conditions for majority rule. Anyone who finds these
axioms desirable on normative grounds must choose majority rule as
the social choice procedure.24
Whatever the appeal of May's axioms, they do not guarantee the
existence of a unique majority winner. When there are three or
more options, majority rule may not yield a determinate outcome
unless the range of individual preference patterns falls into a restric-
tive class. Suppose society must choose one of three options, X, Y,
23. The axiom also rules out a procedure in which Xif socially preferred to Yif more than
60% of the voters prefer X to Y; X is indifferent to Y if from 40% to 60% prefer X; and Y is
-preferred to X if more than 60% prefer Y to X.
24. See A.K. SEN, COLLECrIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 56-70 (1970).
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and Z, and that it votes by majority rule on each pair to find the
option that defeats all others. Then it is possible for Y to beat X, Z
to beat Y, and X to beat Z. The system continuously cycles. The
only way out is to fix the order of voting ahead of time and stop after
three pairwise votes. The individual with the power to set the
agenda then clearly has the power to determine the outcome.25
This difficulty with majority rule has led analysts to consider
other voting methods that avoid this problem. Each one, however,
has its own anomalies and hard cases. Point voting systems, for ex-
ample, in which voters allocate a fixed number of points over all
options, with the high scorer winning, are subject to strategic manip-
ulation.26 In fact, recent work by Gibbard and Satterthwaite has
shown that no plausible choice procedure is strategy-proof.27 Rather
than despairing in the face of such results, however, political econo-
mists should use them to begin a conversation with constitutional
lawyers, whose discussions of majority rule have failed to take social
choice theory seriously. At the very least, a clear statement of the
problems of majoritarian procedures will force constitutional law-
yers to re-examine their oversimplified majoritarian rhetoric. Per-
haps the best way to begin this discussion is to focus on particular
systems that avoid a close connection between skillful political ma-
nipulation and high levels of private wealth and power. Brennan
and Buchanan do nothing to aid this process by assuming these is-
sues out of existence.
Yet even if political economists took this step, a final task would
remain. It is not enough to insulate democratic politics from the un-
due influence of private power. Constitutional analysis must take
seriously the characteristic institutions of a modem representative,
bureaucratic state. These are not details that can be conveniently
25. Voting cycles are clearly discussed in A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 161-77 (1980).
26. A useful discussion of the problems with alternative voting rules is found in Niemi &
Riker, The Choice of Voting Systems, ScI. AM., June 1976, at 21.
27. See A. FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 195-215, for a discussion and annotated bibliogra-
phy. The theorem, proved separately by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, deals with social decision
functions (SDFs) that associate a single social choice with each pattern of individual prefer-
ences. The theorem supposes that we want a SDF to satisfy four conditions. These conditions
are
1) Universality, ie., any preference profile over the alternatives is admissible;
2) Nondictatorship, Ze., no person can determine the social choice irrespective of others'
preferences;
.3) Nondegeneracy, Le., the choice rule is not completely independent of people's prefer-
ences; and
4) Nonmanipulability or cheatproofness, le., no one finds it in his interest to misrepresent
his preferences to gain an advantage.
Gibbard and Satterthwaite show that no SDF satisfies these four conditions.
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assumed away, but are the necessary result of operating a democracy
in a large country facing complex technological, economic, social,
and political problems. The most fundamental difficulty is the lim-
ited time and information available to the citizenry. Authority must
be delegated to others if government is to function at all efficiently.
Of course, with delegation comes the potential for abuse - with a
Leviathan government representing the extreme of self-interested be-
havior by public servants. One must ask, however, whether institu-
tional or procedural constraints can substitute for Brennan and
Buchanan's substantive constitutional limits and prohibitions. A
necessary institutional check, of course, is provided by regular, con-
tested elections. Greedy and corrupt politicians can be voted out of
office when they seek re-election, but this will only happen if voters
know something about the behavior of elected representatives and if
corruption is viewed with disfavor. Elections would do little to en-
sure honest government if politicians merely used their bribe money
to purchase votes.28 Even in less extreme cases where elections are
conducted honestly, voters may simply be ignorant of politicians' be-
havior. Brennan and Buchanan's vision of Leviathan reflects reality
most accurately when government officials have a monopoly on in-
formation about themselves. The procedural approach would, there-
fore, require the constitution to guarantee the right of journalists,
scholars, and ordinary citizens to find out how government is work-
ing. Indeed, it may be possible to construct plausible models in
which some institutions, such as the media, have special rights to
monitor government in the name of democratic values.29
Ordinary citizens may be ineffective in constraining politicians,
not only because of poor information, but also because of the costs of
organizing for political action. Some analysts, most notably Mancur
Olson,30 argue that political participation will be too low because of
"free riding." Citizens with limited time and energy may not find it
worthwhile to organize to lobby for public goods or to monitor offi-
cials because they hope to benefit from the political action under-
taken by others. As a consequence, very few individuals will
participate in politics, and public services will be "undersupplied."
Olson's position, however, implies that politicians will have substan-
tial freedom of action. Therefore, if other groups besides rank and
28. For a further development of these ideas in the context of campaign financing and
legislative corruption, see S. ROsE-ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at chs. 2-4.
29. The courts have not given the press a constitutionally privileged right to information,
but a recent case did assert the public's constitutional right to information about judicial pro-
ceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
30. M. OLsoN, THE LoGic Op COLLECTiVE ACTION (1965).
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file voters lobby for particular policies, it is possible for public serv-
ices to be "oversupplied." In particular, a professional bureaucracy,
charged with carrying out the laws, can have an independent policy-
making role. Theories of "bureaucratic aggrandizement" claim that
bureaucrats with a monopoly over information and expertise will try
to generate large budgets for their agencies and will collude with
elected officials for their mutual benefit.
31
Taken together, the "free rider" and "bureaucratic aggrandize-
ment" theories suggest a more complex judgment of governmental
performance than Brennan and Buchanan's analysis permits.
Rather than a Leviathan single-mindedly maximizing its own wel-
fare, political economy can yield no apriori judgment about whether
government will be "too large" or "too small." What is required is a
series of studies of how different kinds of imperfect information and
alternative organizational structures affect the composition of the
budget and the scope of public regulation.32 It is only in this way
that the constitutionalist can hope to control the uses of specialized
knowledge that are critical in the drafting and administration of
complex modern legislation.
Brennan and Buchanan are right to call for a new political econ-
omy, but they are wrong in describing its purpose. Rather than mak-
ing politics safe for private property, the aim should be to
understand the distinctive character of the modem democratic state.
This project has already been begun by both economists and polit-
ical scientists, and The Power to Tax should not be allowed to deter-
mine the agenda for future discussion between political economists
and constitutional lawyers.
31. See R.D. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY (1979); W. NisKANEN, Bu-
REAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators
and Bureaucracy: InstitutionalDesign in the Public Sector, 68 AM. ECON. REV. - PAPERS &
PRoC. 256 (1978). J. BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 156-61 also raises these issues.
32. See, eg., M. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Author-
ity (Paper Prepared for the Conference on Social Science and Regulatory Policy, sponsored by
the Regulation Program of the National Science Foundation, Reston, Va., Jan. 22-23, 1982).
High-level bureaucrats and elected politicians are not, however, the only public officials
with monopoly power. Low-level bureaucrats who deal directly with the public or with private
firms also can grant favors, apply sanctions, and generally make life easy or difficult for citi-
zens. Regimes that grant many people petty monopoly power over various aspects of life can
be oppressive even if elections are frequent and basic rights are guaranteed. Here structural
reforms that introduce more competition between bureaucrats, convert more regulatory
processes into market-like transactions, and permit appeals to higher levels can reduce monop-
oly power without restricting government's ability to act to correct private market failures and
redistribute income. See S. ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 19, chs. 5-9.
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